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pH 8.5 



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III: us 

;^ 1918 
: Copy 1 



rmany s 
Confession 



The Lichnowsky 
Memorandum 




/^ 



^ Issued by 

THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 
The Secretary of State 
The Secretary of War 
The Secretary of the Navy 
George Creel 



D. Of B. 
SEP 16 1918 



-^ 






GERMANY'S CONFESSION 



It has come at last. After protesting innocence 
and brazenly denying guilt for nearly four years, 
Germany has admitted her crime against civiliza- 
tion. 

She has done it through her former ambassador 
in England, Prince Lichnowsky. He has been 
corroborated by a former director of the great 
Krupp gun factory, a Dr. Muhlon. And the 
truth of their testimony has been substantially 
admitted by the man who was Germany's for- 
eign minister when Prince Lichnowsky was Ger- 
man ambassador in London — namely, Herr von 
Jagow. 

The documents in the case have been obtained 
by the State Department at Washington and 
translated. They are complete and convincing. 

After setting forth all the damning evidence 
against Germany, Prince Lichnowsky sums it up: 

"First. We encouraged Count Berchtold (the 
Austrian foreign minister) to attack Serbia, al- 
though no German interest was involved and the 
danger of a world war must have been known 
to us. Whether or not we knew the text of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia makes no differ- 
ence whatever. 

"Second. We rejected Great Britain's plan of 
mediation in the days between the 23d and 30th 
of July, 1914. We did this after Mr. Sasanof (the 
Russian foreign minister) had emphatically de- 
clared he could not tolerate an attack on Serbia; 

3 



after Serbia, upon pressure from Russia and Eng- 
land, had accepted nearly the whole of the ulti- 
matum, all but two pointi^ in themselves not 
hard to adjust; and even after Count Berchtold 
(the Austrian foreign minister) was ready, to 
be satisfied with the Serbian answer. 

"Third. On the 30th of July, with Count 
Berchtold willing to listen to reason, before Aus- 
tria was touched, on the mere mobilization of 
Russia, we sent our ultimatum to Russia and on 
the 31st of July we declared war on Russia, 
although the Czar had pledged his word that 
as long as negotiations were going on not one 
man would be sent on the march. We thus de- 
liberately destroyed every chance of a peaceful 
settlement. 

*'It is no wonder that in the presence of these 
indisputable facts the whole civilized world out- 
side of Germany lays the entire blame for the 
world war at our door. Is it not natural that 
our foes declare they will not rest until they 
have destro3'ed a system which is a perpetual 
menace to its neighbors? ]\lust they not other- 
wise fear that in a few years they will again be 
compelled to take up arms and see their provinces 
overrun, their cities and villages laid waste?" 

Dr. Muhlon's Evidence. 

Dr. Muhlon, of the board of Krupp's directors, 
does not make a summing up. He merely gives 
evidence that in the middle of July, 1914, he had 
a business conversation with a director of the 
Deutsche Bank in Berlin, who advised him that 
the bank would not assist Krupps in ''certain 
large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey" be- 
cause the political situation had "become veiy 
menacing" and the Deutsche Bank would have 
to wait "before entering into any further engage- 
ments abroad." This director of the Deutsche 
Bank was Dr. Helfferich, since vice chancellor of 



Germany. He explained: "The Austrians have 
just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time 
Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to 
Serbia, with a very short interval for an answer. 
* * * A whole series of definite satisfactions 
will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria- 
Hungary will declare war on Serbia." 

This is the ultimatum about which the Ger- 
man authorities have insisted they were not 
consulted. 

Dr. Muhlon continues: "Dr. Helfferich added 
that the Kaiser had expressed his decided ap- 
proval of this procedure on the part of Austria- 
Hungary. He had said that he regarded a con- 
flict with Serbia as an internal affair between 
these two countries, in which he would permit no 
other state to interfere. If Russia mobilized, he 
v/ouid mobilize also. But in his case mobiliza- 
tion meant immediate war." 

"This uncanny communication," Dr. Muhlon 
saj'-s, "converted my fears of a world war, which 
were already strong, into absolute certainty." 
He consulted with Herr Krupp von Bohlen him^- 
self, in Berlin. And Krupp confirmed the news. 
He said "that the Kaiser had told him (Krupp) 
that he would declare war immediately if Russia 
mobilized, and that this time people would see 
that he did not turn about. The Plaiser's repeated 
insistence that this time nobody would be able 
to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been 
almost comic in its effect." 

On the day when the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia was deli-\'ered the Kaiser was on a yacht- 
ing trip in the North Sea. That fact has often 
been advanced as a proof of German innocence. 
But when Dr. Muhlon read the ultimatum- to 
Serbia he had another interview with Helfferich, 
and he testifies that "Helfferich said to me that 
the Kaiser had gone on his northern cruise only 
as a blind; he had not arranged the cruise on the 



usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at 
hand and keeping in constant touch." 

Von Jagow's Admissions. 

And finally Herr von Jagow, Germany's for- 
eign minister at the outbreak of the war, in 
repljang to Prince Lichnowsky's evidence, makes 
this startling admission, among others: "I by no 
means share the opinion prevalent among us 
to-day that England laid all the mines for the 
outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe 
in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his 
earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. 
* * * Neither was the war popular with the 
English people. Belgium had to serve as a battle 
field." Von Jagow even admits that war might 
have been averted by an international conference 
on the Serbian situation. "We could not agree," 
he says, "to the English proposal of a conference 
of ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led 
to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, was 
pro-Serb, and, with her Balkan interests, stood 
rather opposed to Austria." That is to say. Von 
Jagow admits that war was chosen by Germany 
as an alternative to an international conference, 
which would have declared the Austrian demands 
on Serbia unjust even in the eyes of Italy, the 
ally of Austria and of Germany. 

How did these confessions come to be made? 

Dr. Muhlon's Conscience. 

With Dr. Muhlon it was evidently a case of 
conscience. When the war began he resigned his 
position as a director of Krupp's Works, at 
Essen, and retired to his estate in Switzerland, 
near Berne. There he lived a retired life. After 
a time reports began to circulate of statements 
which he had made to visitors, and he was put 
under the surveillance of spies from the German 
embassy at Berne. Later, members from the 

6 



Socialist Party in the Reichstag visited him, and 
the German press reported that a retired Krupp 
official living in Switzerland "claimed to be in 
possession of certain secrets seriously compro- 
mising the honor of the German Government in 
the matter of the responsibility for the war." 
The newspapers began to hint that this official 
was out of his mind. Dr. Muhlon's statements 
were then published either as a vindication of 
him or as an exposure which should aid the demo- 
cratic revolution in Germany. 

With Prince Lichnowsky it is a different mat- 
ter. He is a nobleman of semi-royal lineage, 
"the sixth prince of the princedom of Gratz in 
Austria and Kuchelna in Prussia." His grand- 
father was one of Beethoven's patrons. Beethoven 
wrote many of his works in the Lichnowsky castle 
at Gratz, where the piano that he used is still 
preserved; and the present prince, Karl Max 
Lichnowsky, has carried on the tradition of cul- 
ture and liberalism which he inherited from his 
family. He was a brother officer of the present 
Kaiser in the Life Guard Hussars of Potsdam, 
but after a brief army career he entered the 
diplomatic service, and held important posts in 
Stockholm, Constantinople, Bucharest, and Vi- 
enna. He retired in 1904, being out of sympathy 
with the Junker atmosphere of the court. He 
was not a Prussian, nor even a German. His 
family was Bohemian, and his mind has never 
been militaristic. 

To his "great surprise," as he says, he was 
offered the post of German ambassador to Lon- 
don in October, 1912, after he had passed eight 
years "among flax and turnips, on horseback and 
in my meadows," amusing his leisure with read- 
ing and with writing occasional political articles. 
"I do not know," he says, "to whom my appoint- 
ment was due — at all events, not to His Majesty, 
as I did not belong to his immediate set, although 



he was always gracious to me. I believe that they 
agreed on me because no other candidate was 
available." 

Lichnowsky Made a Scapegoat. 

When, in spite of his efforts to prevent it, Eng- 
land was involved in war against Germany, he 
returned to Berlin and saw, as he says, that he 
was "to be made the scapegoat for the catas- 
trophe which our Government had brought down 
on us, despite my advice and warning. It was 
deliberately given out, from official quarters, that 
I had let Sir Edward Grey hoodwink me." He 
retired to Gratz, smarting with this injustice, and 
there he prepared a memoir, called ''My Mission 
in London," for the private information of his 
kinsmen and his intimate political friends. 

Of this m^emoir he had five or six typewritten 
copies made. One he sent to Herr Ballin, the 
head of the Hamburg-American Line; a second 
to Herr Gwinner, the head of the Deutsche Bank ; 
and a third to Herr Theodor Wolff, editor of the 
Radical-Democratic newspaper, the Berliner 
Tageblatt. A fourth copy went to a friend, an 
officer attached to the political department of 
the German General Staff. This officer appears 
to have manifolded it on his own responsibility 
and sent copies to various State officials and poli- 
ticians. He did that, Herr Theodor Wolff says, 
because *'he felt the longing to serve the dictates 
of peace with complete devotion, and he sur- 
rendered himself to a pacifism which is absolutely 
incompatible with a military uniform." He con- 
fessed to Herr Wolff what he had done. "It was 
impossible," the editor says, "to convince him by 
any logic or on any grounds of reason that his 
action was wrong, senseless, or harmful. He was 
a Marquis Posa, or, still more, a Horatius Codes, 
who, out of love for Rome or for mankind, sprang 
into the abyss." 

8 



One of his copies of the memoir reached the 
socialist newspaper Politiken in Stockhohn and 
was published piecemeal. The German press 
took it up. The Reichstag debated it. Lichnow- 
sky was deprived of his diplomatic rank, forbid- 
den to write for publications, and virtually im- 
prisoned on his estates. The newspapers de- 
manded that he be court-martialed. A typical 
letter, printed in the semi-official Cologne 
Gazette, demanded that he "be held up to public 
contempt ruthlessly." The writer argued: "What 
will our thousands of war cripples say when this 
affair is brought to their outraged notice? Have 
these men joyfully sacrificed their health only to 
be told at this stage of the war by a Prince Lich- 
nowsky that it was not necessary?" 

England's Guilt a Fiction. 

Yon Jagow's reply to the Prince only served to 
make matters worse. His admission that Eng- 
land had not brought on the war enraged the Pan- 
German press. It was seized upon triumphantly 
by the Socialists. The Socialist organ, Vorwaerts, 
says : 

"Let us establish the facts. * * * The war 
was not popular in England; it also was not 
popular in Russia and France. But it has become 
popular. The whole world — right away across 
the Atlantic and the Pacific — is united in hatred 
against us. We, however, have for almost four 
years been inoculated with the view that 'Eng- 
land laid all the mines which caused the war' — 
a view which the Secretary of State (Von Jagow), 
in accordance with the evidence of the ambassador 
(Prince Lichnowsky), has now declared to be 
false! It is, however, by this false view that the 
whole war policy of the German Empire has 
been directed — from the declaration of unre- 
stricted submarine warfare, which brought us war 
with America, down to those chancellor speeches 



which say that Belgium must not again become 
England's area of military concentration. If all 
the parties concerned were convinced that the 
belief in England's guilt is a fiction, why did they 
feed this belief, and why did they pursue a policy 
which was based upon it?" And the paper con- 
cluded: "The German people can not be satisfied 
with the methods of governing exercised before 
and during the war. * * * The German people 
can only endure after the war as a peace-loving 
nation that governs itself." 

Germany's Place in the Sun. 

But to the American reader, the most important 
part of Prince Lichnowsky's exposure is not his 
conclusion that Germany forced a declaration of 
war. We have long believed that. Our German 
sympathizers have largely admitted it. But they 
have pleaded that the Kaiser declared war only 
because war was inevitable; that Germany was 
denied her "place in the sun"; that a conspiracy 
of France, Russia, and Great Britain prevented 
her from obtaining colonies and extending her 
trade; and that, consequently, Germany had 
either to take up arms or be throttled to death by 
Great Britain's trade enmity. Many of us have 
been persuaded that these excuses are true ex- 
cuses; that the British policy compelled Ger- 
many's appeal to the sword, and that Britain's 
allies are merely "pulling Britain's chestnuts out 
of the fire," as the German propagandists are con- 
tinually charging. 

Of those procured lies, Prince Lichnowsky's 
memoirs give a very happy disproof. 

It has been pleaded that the policy of France 
and England in Morocco was anti-German. 
Prince Lichnowsky writes: "Our obscure policy 
in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of 
our peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised 
doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted, 

10 



or whether our intention was to keep Europe in 
a state of suspense, and, on occasion, to humiliate 
the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a 
long time in Paris, said to me, 'The French had 
begun to forget "la revanche" (their desire to 
avenge Alsace-Lorraine). You have regularly- 
reminded them of it by trampling on their toes.' 
After we had declined Delcasse's (the French 
minister's) offer to come to an agreement re- 
garding Morocco and then solemnly declared that 
we had no political interest there, we suddenly 
discovered in Abdul Aziz a second Kruger. To 
him also, as to the Boers, we promised the 
protection of the mighty German Empire, and 
with the same result. Both manifestations con- 
cluded, as they were bound to conclude, with a 
retraction, if we were not prepared to start a 
world war. * * * Our attitude furthered the 
Russian-Japanese and the Russian-British alli- 
ances. In the face of 'the German peril' all other 
considerations faded into the background. The 
possibility of another war between France and 
Germany had been evident, and such a war could 
not leave out Russia or England, as in 1870. 
* * * Before Delcasse's fall, and before the 
Algeciras conference, we could have obtained har- 
bors and bases on the west coast of Africa, but 
that was no longer possible." 

In other words, according to Germany's am- 
bassador, it was Germany's threat of war that 
united the European nations against her in 
Africa. It was not their union that led to the 
German threat. 

England's Attempts at Friendship. 

Nevertheless, Lichnowsky goes on to say, Lon- 
don "quieted down on the Moroccan affair." The 
Haldane mission had gone to Berlin to come to 
an understanding with Germany, and that mission 
failed, Lichnowsky confesses, "because we de- 
ll 



manded a promise of neutrality" from Great 
Britain in the event of a European war, "instead 
of being satisfied with a treaty which secured us 
against British attack or against any attack with 
British support." He continues: "However, Sir 
Edward Grey had not given up the idea of com- 
ing to an understanding with us. and his first 
attempts in that direction were in connection with 
matters relating to trade and colonies. * * * 
After reaching a settlement with France and 
Russia on the old questions in dispute, the 
British statesman intended to come to similar 
agreements with us. What he aimed at was not to 
isolate us, but rather to have us, as much as 
possible, take a share in the existing partner- 
ships. Having succeeded in bridging over the 
differences which existed between England and 
France and between England and Russia, he also 
wanted to remove, as well as might be, the differ- 
ences between England and Germany, and to 
insure the peace of the world by means of a 
network of treaties which should ultimately also 
include a settlement of the miserable naval ques- 
tion; whereas the consequences of our own for- 
eign policy up to then had been the formation 
of the entente partnership in which these nations 
pledged themselves to render mutual support in 
case of war. As he himself expressed it. Grey's 
policy was this: 'Without infringing on the ex- 
isting friendly relations with France and Russia, 
which in themselves contained no aggressive ele- 
ments and no binding obligations for England, to 
seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement 
with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer 
together.' " 

British Concessions in the Balkans. 

That this statement of England's policy was 
not a mere pretense. Prince Lichnowsky proves in 
his long account of the negotiations arising out of 

12 



the Balkan War and the establishment of Al- 
bania. *'At the outbreak of that war," he says, 
"we (Germany) had unfortunately declined the 
proposal of the French Government to join in a 
declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality 
on the part of the powers." On the other hand, he 
says of Lord Grey: "From the beginning, the 
British statesman took the stand that England 
had no interest in Albania and was therefore un- 
willing to be involved in a war over this ques- 
tion. He wished simply as an honest broker to 
mediate between the two groups and settle diffi- 
culties. Thus he in no wise placed himself on the 
side of the entente (his allies) and during the 
negotiations, which lasted about eight months, 
by virtue of his good will and weighty influence, 
he contributed not a little toward bringing about 
concord and agreement. Instead of taking a posi- 
tion similar to that of the English, we invariably 
assumed the attitude prescribed to us from Vi- 
enna * * * On every point, including Al- 
bania, the Serbian harbors, in the Adriatic, Scu- 
tari, and the definition of the Albanian frontiers, 
we were on the side of Austria and Italy, whilst 
Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or 
Russian point of view. On the contrary, he 
nearly always took our part in order to give no 
pretext for war. It was with his help that King 
Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Other- 
wise there would have been war over this matter, 
as we should never have dared to ask our allies 
to make concessions. 

"Lord Grey conducted the negotiations with 
circumspection, calmness, and tact. Whenever a 
question threatened to become involved, he 
would draft an appropriate formula of agree- 
ment which invariably proved acceptable to all. 
His personality commanded equal confidence 
among all the members of the conference. Once 
more we issued successfully from one of those 

13 



numerous tests of strength which are character- 
istic of our foreign policy. Russia had had to 
yield to us at every point, so that she was never 
in a position to further Serbian ambitions. Al- 
bania was created an Austrian vassal State and 
Serbia was driven from the sea. The result of 
the conference was therefore a fresh humiliation 
for Russian self-consciousness." 

British Concessions in Africa. 

Similarly, when Germany sought concessions in 
the Portuguese colonies in Africa, England, as 
the protector of Portuguese interests in Africa, 
assisted German}^ in obtaining all she wished. 
"Thanks to the obliging attitude of the British 
Government," Prince Lichnowsky writes, "I suc- 
ceeded in giving the new treaty a form which 
fully coincided with our wishes and interests. 
All of Angola up to the twentieth degree of longi- 
tude was assigned to us, so that we reached the 
Congo region from the south; and we received 
the valuable islands of San Thome and Principe, 
which lie north of the Equator and therefore 
really belong to the French sphere of interest — 
a fact which led my fi'rench colleague to lively 
though fruitless counter representations. Further- 
more, we received the northern part of Mozam- 
bique, the Likungo forming the boundary. 

"The British Government showed the greatest 
obligingness in behalf of our interests. Grey 
wanted to manifest his good will toward us, but 
he was also interested in furthering our colonial 
expansion, it being the English idea to divert 
the developing German strength away from the 
North Sea and western Europe out into the open 
ocean and Africa. *We do not begrudge Germany 
her colonial expansion,' said a member of the 
Cabinet to me. Great Britain originally proposed 
to include the Congo in the treaty as well. This 
would have given us a right of preemption and an 

14 



opportunity for economic penetration. However, 
we declined this offer, ostensibly out of regard for 
Belgian susceptibilities. * * * The sincerity of 
the British Government in its efforts to respect 
our rights was shown by the fact that Grey, even 
before the treaty was completed or signed, re- 
ferred to us certain English promoters seeking in- 
vestments of capital in the territories assigned to 
us by the new treaty and desiring British backing 
in the matter. He did this with the remark that 
the enterprise contemplated belonged within our 
sphere of interest." 

British Concessions in Asia Minor. 

Prince Lichnowsky continues: "At the same 
time I was carrying on in London negotiations 
regarding the so-called Bagdad treaty. * * * 
The real purpose of this treaty was to divide Asia 
Minor into spheres of interest, although this 
expression was carefully avoided out of regard 
for the rights of the Sultan. Sir Edward Grey 
repeatedly declared, however, that there existed 
no agreements with France and Russia for the 
purpose of partitioning Asia Minor. 

"After enlisting the aid of a Turkish repre- 
sentative, in the person of Hakki Pasha, all eco- 
nomic questions connected with German enter- 
prises were adjusted essentially in accordance with 
the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most im- 
portant concession that Sir Edward Grey made 
to me personally was the prolongation of the 
railroad to Basra, for this point had been given 
up by us in favor of the connection to Alexan- 
dre tta. Bagdad had hitherto constituted the 
terminal point of the road. An international 
commission was to attend to the navigation on 
the Shatt-el-Arab. We also had a share in the 
harbor construction at Basra, and obtained 
rights in the navigation of the Tigris which had 
hitherto been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch. 

15 



Under this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia 
as far as Basra came into our sphere of inter- 
est in so far as this did not encroach upon 
prior British rights, as in the case of the Tigris 
navigation and the Wilcox irrigation plant, and 
the whole territory of the Bagdad & Anatolian 
Railroad." 

British Not Jealous. 
The English felt "uncomfortable," Prince Lich- 
nowsky says, about the great increases in the 
German fleet. He admits, however, that "Eng- 
land would no more have drawn the sword solely 
on account of our Navy than on account of our 
commerce, which is supposed to have aroused her 
envy and in the end brought the war to a head. 

* * * The talk of English commercial jeal- 
ousy, of which one hears so much among us, is 
based upon a wrong judgment of conditions. Ger- 
many's rise as a commercial power after the^war 
of the seventies and in the following decades was 
certainly a menace to British commerce, whose 
industries and export houses enjoyed a sort of 
monopoly. But the increasing trade with Ger- 
many, which ranked as England's best customer, 
made it desirable for England to remain on good 
terms with her best customer and business friend, 
and gradually supplanted all other considerations. 
The Briton is matter of fact; he reconciles him- 
self to facts and does not tilt against windmills. 
It was precisely in commercial circles that I met 
with the most friendly reception and observed an 
effort to promote economic interests common to 
both countries. * * * i became convinced soon 
after my arrival (in England) that we did not in 
the least have to fear an English attack or Eng- 
lish support of a foreign attack, but that England 
under all circumstances would protect France. 

* * * I never ceased to point out that as a 
commercial nation England would suffer enor- 
mously in any war between the great European 

16 



powers, and would therefore seek by every means 
to prevent it, but that in the interest of the Euro- 
pean balance of power and in order to prevent a 
preponderance of German power she would not 
tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. 
Lord Haldane had told me this soon after my 
arrival. Every person in authority expressed him- 
self to the same eliect." 

Late in June of the fatal summer of 1914, 
Prince Lichnowsky was summoned to Kiel by 
the Kaiser, and he was on board the imperial 
j'acht Meteor, when word v/as received of the 
murder of the Austrian Archduke. "Being unac- 
quainted with the Vienna viewpoint and what 
was going on there," he says, "I attached no very 
far-reaching significance to the event ; ' but, look- 
ing back, I could feel sure that in the Austrian 
aristocracy a feeling of relief outweighed ail 
others." As for the . Kaiser, "His Majesty re- 
gretted that his efforts to win over the Arch- 
duke to his ideas had been thus frustrated" by the 
Archduke's assassination. 

Lichnowsky went on to Berlin and saw the 
Chancellor, von Bethmann-Holiweg. "I told him 
that I regarded our foreign situation as very sat- 
isfactory as it was a long time indeed since we 
had stood so well with England. And in France 
there was a pacifist cabinet. Herr von Bethmann- 
Holiweg did not seem to share my optim.ism. He 
complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to 
tranquillize him with the argument that it was 
not to Russia's interest to attack us, and that 
such an attack would never have English or 
French support, as both countries wanted peace. 

"I went from him to Dr. Zimmerm.ann (the 
under Secretary'),' who was acting for Herr von 
Jagow (the Foreign Secretary) and learned from 
him that Russia was about to call up nine hun- 
dred thousand new troops. His words unmis- 
takably denoted ill humor against Russia, who 

17 



he said stood everywhere in our way. In addi- 
tion, there were questions of commercial policy 
that had to be settled. That General von Moltke 
was urging war was, of course, not told to me. I 
learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschky (the 
German Ambassador in Vienna) had been re- 
proved because he said that he had advised Vi- 
enna to show moderation toward Serbia." 

Prince Lichnowsky went to his summer home 
in Silesia, quite unaware of the impending 
crisis. "When I returned from Silesia on my way 
to London," he says, "I stopped only a few hours 
in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended 
to proceed against Serbia so as to bring to an end 
an unbearable state of affairs. Unfortunately I 
failed at the moment to guage the significance of 
the news. I thought that once more it would 
come to nothing; that even if Russia acted 
threateningly, the matter could soon be settled. 
I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and 
declare there and then that I would have no hand 
in such a policy." 

And here he interpolates some most significant 
sentences. The world has heard various reports 
of a meeting in Potsdam, as early as July 5, be- 
tween the German and Austrian authorities, at 
which meeting war was decided on. Prince Lich- 
nowsky says: "I learned afterwards that at the 
decisive discussion at Potsdam on July 5th the 
Austrian demand had met with the unconditional 
approval of all the personages in authority; it 
was even added that no harm v»^ould be done if 
war with Russia did come out of it. It was so 
stated at least in the Austrian report received at 
London by Count Mensdorff (the Austrian Am- 
bassador to England)." 

He continues: "At this point I received instruc- 
tions to endeavor to bring the English press to a 
friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the 
death-blow to 'Greater-Serbian' hopes. I was to 

18 



use all my influence to prevent public opinion in 
England from taking a stand against Austria. I 
remembered England's attitude during the Bos- 
nian annexation crisis, when public opinion 
showed itself in sympathy with the Serbian claims 
to Bosnia; I recalled also the benevolent pro- 
motion of nationalist hopes that went on in the 
days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi; and on these 
and other grounds I thought it extremely un- 
likely that English public opinion would support 
a punitive expedition against the Archduke's mur- 
derers. I thus felt it my duty to enter an urgent 
warning against the whole project, which I char- 
acterized as venturesome and dangerous, I recom- 
mended that counsels of moderation be given 
Austria, as I did not believe that the conflict 
could be localized" — (that is to say, it could not 
be limited to a war between Austria and Serbia). 
"Herr von Jagov/ answered me that Russia was 
not prepared; that there would be more or less 
of a rumpus; but that the more firmly we stood 
by Austria the more surely would Russia give 
way. Austria was already blaming us for flabbi- 
ness and we could not flinch. On the other hand 
Russian sentiment was growing more unfriendly 
all the time, and we must simply take the risk, 
I subsequently learned that this attitude was 
based on advices from Count Pourtales (the Ger- 
man Ambassador in Petrograd), that Russia 
would not stir under any circumstances; informa- 
tion which prompted us to spur Count Berchtold 
on in his course. On learning the attitude of the 
German Government I looked for salvation 
through English mediation, knowing that Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be used 
in the cause of peace. I, therefore, availed m}^- 
self of my friendly relations with the Minister to 
ask him confidentially to advise moderation in 
Russia in case Austria demanded satisfaction from 
the Serbians, as it seemed likely she would." 

19 



England Friendly in July, 1914. 

"The English press was quiet at first, and 
friendly to Austria, the assassination being gen- 
erally condemned. By degrees, however, more 
and more voices made themselves heard, in the 
sense that, however necessary it might be to take 
cognizance of the crime, anj'- exploitation of it 
for political ends w^as unjustifiable. Moderation 
was enjoined upon Austria. When the ultimatum 
came out, all the papers, with the exception of the 
Standard, were unanimous in condemning it. The 
v.'hole world, outside of Berlin and Vienna, real- 
ized that it meant war, and a world war too. The 
English fleet, which happened to have been hold- 
ing a naval review, was not demobilized." 

The British Government labored to make the 
Serbian reply conciliator}^, and "the Serbian an- 
swer was in keeping with the British efforts." Sir 
Edward Grey then proposed his plan of media- 
tion upon the two points which Serbia had not 
wholly conceded. Prince Lichnowsky writes: 
"Mr. Cambon (for France), Marquis Imperiali 
(for Italy), and I were to meet, v/ith Sir Edward 
in the chair, and it would have been easy to v/ork 
out a formula for the debated points, v/hich had 
to do v/ith the co-operation of imperial and royal 
officials in the inquiries to be conducted at Bel- 
grade. By the . exercise of good v\dll everything 
could have been settled in one or two sittings, 
and the mere acceptance of the British proposal 
would have relieved the strain and further im- 
proved our relations with England. I seconded 
this plan with all my energies. In vain. I was 
told (by Berlin) that it would be against the dig- 
nity of Austria. Of course, all that was needed 
was one hint from Berlin to Count Berchtold (the 
Austrian Foreign Minister) ; he would have satis- 
fied himself with a diplomatic triumph and rested 
on the Serbian answer. That hint was never 

20 



..liven. On the contrary, pressnirc was brought in 
favor of war. * '■'' * 

Germany Insisted on War. 

"After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come 
forward with our proposal. We insisted on war. 
No other answer could I get (from Berlin) than 
that it was a colossal condescension on the part 
of Austria not to contemplate any acquisition of 
territory. Sir Edward justly pointed out that 
one could reduce a country to vassalage without 
acquiring territory; that Russia would see this, 
and regard it as a humiliation not to be put up 
with. The impression grew stronger and stronger 
tliat we were bent on war. Otherwise our atti- 
tude toward a question in which we were not di- 
rectly concerned was incomprehensible. The in- 
sistent requests and well-defined declarations of 
M. Sasanof, the Czar's positivel}^ humble tele- 
grams later on, Sir Edward's repeated proposals, 
the warnings of Marquis San Giuliano and of Bol- 
lati, my own pressing admonitions were all of 
no avail. Berlin remained inrlexibie — Serbia must 
be slaughtered." 

"Then, on the 29th, Sir Edward decided upon 
his well-knov/n warning. I told him I had ahvays 
reported (to Berlin) that we should have to 
reckon with English opposition if it came to a 
war with France. Time and again the Minister 
said to me, 'If war breaks out it will be the 
greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.' 
And now events moved rapidly. Count Berch- 
told at last decided to come around, having up 
to that point played the role of 'Strong man' 
under guidance from Berlin. Thereupon we (in 
answer to Russia's mobilization) sent our ulti- 
matum and declaration of war — after Russia had 
spent a whole week in fruitless negotiation and 
waiting." 

21 



Germany Ruled by Duellists. 

War was declared. "Thus ended my mission to 
London," Prince Lichnowsky says. "It had suf- 
fered shipwreck, not on the wiles of the Briton but 
on the wiles of our own policy." And of the 
German traditions that made this policy possible, 
he concludes: "Were not those right who saw that 
the German people was pervaded with the spirit 
of Treitscke and Bernardi, which glorifies war as 
an end instead of holding it in abhorrence as an 
evil thing? They said that the feudal knight 
and junker, the warlike caste and not the civilian 
lilies, and imposes its own ideals and values; that 
the love of the duel which animates the university 
students is still cherished by those who guide the 
people's destinies. Had not the Zabern affair and 
the debate on the case in the Reichstag shown the 
outer world how civil rights and liberties are rated 
with us when they conflict with military prestige? 
* * * Properly speaking militarism is a school 
for the people and an instrument to further 
political ends. But, in the patriarchal absolutism 
of a military monarchy, militarism exploits poli- 
tics to further its own ends, and can create a situ- 
ation which a democracy freed from junkerdom 
would not tolerate. 

"That is what our enemies think; that is what 
they are bound to think when they see that in 
spite of capitalistic industrialism and in spite of 
socialistic organizations, the living, as Nietsche 
said, are still ruled by the dead. The democratiz- 
ation of Germany, the first war aim proposed by 
our enemies, will become a reality." 

That is Germany's confession of sin and avowal 
of repentance, as made by her ambassador to 
Great Britain. It leaves her without any justifi- 
cation, except the one which Lichnowsky pleads, 
that she is governed by a caste of duellists who 
are determined to dominate the world by the 
sword. That sword will have to be broken in the 

22 



hands of the Kaiser before the world will be able 
to live with Germany. Lichnowsky, like Muhlon, 
foresees it. 

Germany to Blame. 

Vorwaerts, the socialist newspaper of Germany, 
foresees it. And the German-Americans are be- 
ginning to foresee it, too. One of their most 
influential dailies, the Germania-Herold, of Mil- 
waukee, has made editorially "An Open Confes- 
sion," which reads: 

"It is our duty to make it. We, too, were among 
those who laid the blame for the world war at 
the doors of English statesmen. We, too, have 
time and again repeated the assertion to our 
readers that these English statesmen, jealous of 
Germany's success in the world markets, at- 
tempted to 'encircle' German3^ We, too, have 
repeatedly stated that Germany is entitled to a 
place in the sun. We did so in good faith. For 
we then believed what the organs of the Ger- 
man Government proclaimed. We believed at 
the beginning of the war, and years thereafter, 
what most of the other German papers repeated. 

"We were then fully convinced, that the pro- 
gram of English statesmen consisted of nothing 
less than to stop Germany's commercial and co- 
lonial expansion. With us one-half of the world 
of the western hemisphere was convinced through 
the press of Germany. We believed in the press 
of the old fatherland, which preached hatred 
against England everywhere, following its gov- 
ernmental press, where the German voice was 
sounded. Sir Edward Grey, the dictator of for- 
eign affairs for Great Britain, appeared to us as 
a paragon of baseness. Now we and with us the 
rest of the world which then credulously listened, 
are convinced of the opposite. We know now 
that the British statesmen, and with them the 
statesmen of the allies, did not only have no war- 

23 



like measures against Germany in mind but tc 
the last minute endeavored to their utmost tol 
avoid the war. The blame for the bloodshed lies! 
v/ith the German Government. 

"Politiken, the organ of the Swedish socialists! 
of the extreme left, on March 15, published the| 
historical document by which this guilt is estab- 
lished. It was a so-called 'memorandum' by 
Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, who before and at I 
the time of the com.mencement of the war was| 
the ambassador for the German empire in Lon- 
don." 

After quoting at length from the "memoran- 
dum," the editor says: "It is to be remembered 
that these words are not those of a.n English- 
man. They are the words of one of the noblest 
of the German nation, to which the .German 
Emperor entrusted the m.ost important foreign 
post and with whom William II in his youth was 
closely associated." And the editor concludes: 
"Who bears the blame that the German people 
were goaded into a furious hate and thereby into 
a war spirit? Only those in the service of the 
junker class, who are- the ruling military caste 
in Germany, in control of the government. The 
pan-Germans in their megalomania are the ones 
who brought about this calamity upon the Ger- 
man people." 



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